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PROSECUTOR V TADIC: LEGITIMIZING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
I. INTRODUCTION
It is said that the first casualty of war is innocence.1 The Bosnian
Muslims and Croats confined within the Serbian prison camp of
Omarska during the summer of 1992 know all too well the poignant
accuracy of this statement. After the beginning of open hostilities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, non-Serbs of the Prijedor region
of northwest Bosnia were rounded up and forced to march in col-
umns to prison camps. Subjected to brutal living conditions, prison-
ers were crowded together and fed starvation rations once a day.
Both female and male prisoners were beaten, raped, tortured, and
murdered by Serbian guards.
According to investigators, chief among these purveyors of misery
was Dusko Tadic. A part-time karate instructor and officer in the
reserve militia before the breakup of Yugoslavia, Tadic is alleged to
have used his talents to inflict immense pain and suffering on the
prisoners around him. The horrific crimes he is charged with com-
mitting include: summarily executing prisoners, forcing prisoners to
drink water from puddles on the ground like animals, discharging
the contents of a fire extinguisher into the mouth of a prisoner, and
forcing a prisoner to castrate another prisoner with his mouth.
In Prosecutor v. Tadic,2 the Appeals Chamber of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vi-
olations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 ("International Tribunal")
considered a multifaceted jurisdictional challenge by Dusko Tadic
after his indictment for violations of international humanitarian law.
In a wide-ranging, comprehensive opinion, the Appeals Chamber
held that (1) the International Tribunal had been lawfully estab-
lished in accordance with the United Nations Charter, (2) the pri-
macy of the International Tribunal over national courts did not
wrongly infringe upon the sovereignty of member States, and (3) the
International Tribunal had subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
1. Offering a soldier's view of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in 1945, Paul Fussell notes in a controversial article that "[i]n life,
experience is the great teacher." PAUL FUSSELL, THANK GOD FOR T14E ATOMIC
BOMB AND OTHER ESSAYS 13 (1988). From Fussell's perspective, the experience of
"having to come to grips, face to face, with an enemy who designs your death" will
profoundly affect one's views on the ethics of war. Id. at 14.
2. 35 I.L.M. 32 (Int'l Crim. Tib. for the Former Yugo. App. Chamber 1995).
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The decision by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic represents an im-
portant development in the field of international humanitarian law.
The Tadic decision is significant because it addresses the validity of
the creation of an international criminal tribunal by the Security
Council, the first such tribunal ever constituted by the global com-
munity through the United Nations. The Tadic decision is also nota-
ble for its ruling on the characterization of the Yugoslav conflict and
for the various principles of international humanitarian law applica-
ble to offenses committed in that conflict. Part II of this Note exam-
ines the recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, how the
International Tribunal was established in response to the atrocities
committed in that conflict, and a brief history of war crimes tribu-
nals. Part III outlines the facts of the subject case, the arguments
expounded by each side on appeal, and the decision of the Appeals
Chamber. Part IV of this Note examines the rationale of this deci-
sion and its impact on the future of the International Tribunal.
I1. BACKGROUND
A. Chronology of the Breakup of Yugoslavia
Prior to 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("Yu-
goslavia") was composed of six republics-Serbia, Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia-and two
autonomous regions-Kosovo and Vojvodina. Although the Re-
public was held together for thirty-three years by the forceful per-
sonality of communist leader Marshall Tito, his death in 1980
precipitated an economic crisis and increased ethnic tensions among
the four major ethnic groups of Yugoslavia--Serbs, Bosnian Mus-
lims, Croats, and Slovenes.3 While the Republic of Serbia consoli-
dated political control over the other republics during the late 1980s,
the governing Communist Party crumbled in the face of inter-ethnic
squabblings and the general wave of capitalistic euphoria that en-
gulfed Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War.4 By 1991, the
communists had lost power in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, and Macedonia.5
Negotiations between Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia on a future
form of government failed when Serbia rejected a "loose confedera-
tion" Slovene-Croat proposal.6 The more industrialized republics of
Croatia and Slovenia objected to subsidizing the weak economy of
Serbia and desired a loose democratic confederation, while Serbia
wished to retain a strong centralized communist system to ensure
3. See Karl Arthur Hochkammer, Note, The Yugoslav War Crimes Trbunak The
Compatibility of Peace, Politics, and International Law, 28 VARN. J. TR SNA-r'L_ L
119, 125 & n.32 (1995).
4. See id. at 125-26.
5. See id. at 126.
6. See id.
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economic support.7 Croatia and Slovenia promptly declared inde-
pendence on June 25, 1991, and war erupted soon thereafter when
the Serb-controlled Yugoslav People's Army attacked Slovenia.8
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia began consolidating territory under
their control and implementing a policy of "ethnic cleansing."9
On April 7, 1992, the United States recognized Croatia, Slovenia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent sovereign states. 10 That
same day, Bosnian Serbs declared their own independent state
within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and full-scale war broke out between
Serbs, Muslims, and Croats." The Muslims and Croats of Bosnia
soon forged an alliance, as Croatia was still fighting Serbs in its own
territory.' 2 The United Nations was quick to condemn Serbian ag-
gression but reluctant to become bogged down in the mire of a land
war. Eventually, the Security Council established an arms embargo
against all parties to the conflict 3 and dispatched a U.N. Peacekeep-
ing Force to the area. 4
B. Events in the Prijedor Region of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Opstina Prijedor is a district in northwest Bosnia, situated be-
tween the regional capital of Banja Luka (to the east), the Bosnian-
Croatian border towns of Bosanski Novi (to the west) and Bosanski
Dubica (to the north), and the town of Sanski Most (to the south).'"
Opstina Prijedor is located within a corridor that connects Serbian
dominated areas in the Krajina area to the west and Serbia proper
7. See id. at n.45.
8. See id. at 127.
9. This oft-used term refers to the alleged practice of Serbs who "wanted to cre-
ate a Greater Serbia by ripping out of the map of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
those territories where Serbs lived in large numbers, cleansing them of non-Serbs
and attaching them to the country calling itself Yugoslavia." Court TV Library, De-
velopments in the War Crimes Trial of Bosnian Serb Dusko Tadic from May 7-10,
1996 (visited Mar. 4, 1997) <http'//www.courttv.com/casefiles/warcrimes/reports/
weekl.html>.
10. See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 128. Each of these republics was formally
admitted to the United Nations on May 22, 1992. See id. at n.58.
11. See id. at 128.
12. See id.
13. See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESn13
(1991). "The Security Council[s] ... [d]eeply concerned by the fighting in Yugosla-
via which is causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage ... [and] consti-
tutes a threat to international peace and security... [diecides... that all States shall
... immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of
weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.... ." Id. at 3.
14. See S.C. Res. 721, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3018th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESn21
(1992).
15. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, U.N. SCOR Commission of
Experts on the Former Yugoslavia, § IV(A)(1) 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)
[hereinafter Commission of Experts Report]. See infra notes 51-52 and accompany-
ing text for a history of the Commission and its investigative work.
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in the east.16 Thus, Prijedor had a special military significance to
Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. According to a 1991 census, its popu-
lation was 112,470, of whom 44% were Muslim, 42.5% Serb, 5.6%
Croat, and 7.9% others.'
When war broke out in Croatia and Slovenia in the summer of
1991, the Yugoslav People's Army attempted to mobilize all active
and reserve soldiers."8 The Muslims and Croats of Bosnia did not
honor the mobilization effort, causing "great resentment on the part
of the Serbian population."1 9 The federal government began co-
vertly arming the Serbian population with machine guns, automatic
rifles, grenades, and ammunition?' By early 1992, the Prijedor
Serbs had established a shadow government that paralleled the ex-
isting Muslim administration, complete with a pure Serbian police
force and secret service.2? '
Following the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Euro-
pean Community and the United States in April 1992, the Bosnian
Serbs declared their own independent state within Bosnia and mo-
bilized for war. 2 Roadblocks were erected on all major roads in
Opstina Prijedor, and non-Serbs were directed to turn in their weap-
ons. 3 On the night of April 30, Serbs seized power in Prijedor, tak-
ing control of all official buildings and radio stations.24 Most non-
Serbs were dismissed from their jobs and put on "waiting lists" for
new positions.2 On May 4, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ordered the "withdrawal" of all members of the Yugoslav People's
Army. The "withdrawal" was in reality a conversion of most of the
16. The Krajina is the traditional name for the area of land that overlaps the
border of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has been populated by Serbs for
many years. See Michael J. Keegan, Annexure "MK 1" to Application for Deferral
(visited Jan. 18,1997) <gopher'J/gopher.igc.apc... adic/Keegan.declaration> [herein-
after Keegan Declaration]. An investigator in the Prosecutor's Office of the Interna-
tional Tribunal, Keegan describes how the conflict in Croatia focused on "the
Serbian claim to the Krajina as an independent Serbian republic with direct ties to
Serbia proper." Id.
17. See Commission of Experts Report, supra note 15, § IV(A)(1). Thus, the non-
Serb population numbered approximately 65,000 people in 1991. According to a
population count conducted in June 1993, only 11,914 non-Serbs remained in the
Prijedor area. See id. Most of the other 52,811 non-Serbs were either killed or de-
ported, with a limited number having fled the region as refugees. See id.
18. See Keegan Declaration, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. Seeid.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. Many non-Serbs were visited by Serbian "officials" and "encouraged"
to hand over their weapons. See id.
24. See id. As a result of the Serbian takeover, communications betveen Opstina
Prijedor and the outside world were severed. See Commission of Experts Report,
supra note 15, § IV(A)(3).
25. See Keegan Declaration, supra note 16. These "lists" were later used at the
detention camps to identify and classify prisoners. See id.
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Yugoslav People's Army into the new Bosnian Serb army under the
leadership of General Ratko Mladic. 26
To protect outlying communities from roaming bands of gunmen,
many Muslim villages set up their own roadblocks. On May 22,
1992, a fateful encounter took place at one of these roadblocks.2 7 A
vehicle containing four Serbs and a Croat was stopped at a Muslim
checkpoint outside the village of Hambarine.2 Words, and then
bullets, were exchanged, resulting in the death of two men in the
car.29 Serbian officials thereafter demanded the person responsible
for the shooting be turned over within twenty-four hours.30 As soon
as the deadline passed, the Serbs launched a massive artillery and
tank assault on Hambarine. 1'
An attack on Prijedor soon followed, with much of the Muslim
areas of the city destroyed by wanton pillaging and plunder.32 Most
of the non-Serb residents of Prijedor were "evacuated" to three
main camps in the area: Omarska, a former mine complex; Ker-
aterm, a former ceramics factory; and Tmopolje, a complex of build-
ings including a former school.33 The primary purpose of the
Omarska and Keraterm camps was to incarcerate any male, non-
Serb between the ages of sixteen and sixty. 4 Leaders, prominent
citizens, or those who had actively resisted in the non-Serb commu-
nity were sent to Omarska, which was regarded as the harsher of the
two facilities. 35 The remaining members of the male population
were sent to Keraterm, while women were normally taken to the
36Trnopolje camp.
When captives arrived at Keraterm and Omarska, they usually en-
dured a regimen of abuse that was strictly administered by the Ser-
bian guards.37 New prisoners were typically beaten upon arrival,
robbed of their possessions, and denied food and water for the first
forty-eight to ninety-six hours.38 Within the first ninety-six hours,
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. The Serbian authorities insisted that Aziz Aliskovic, a non-Serb who
formerly worked as a policeman, had committed the shooting, despite the lack of
any evidence that he was involved in the incident. See id.
31. See Commission of Experts Report, supra note 15, § IV(A)(4).
32. See Keegan Declaration, supra note 16.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. "[T]here was regular communication, cooperation and transfer of
prisoners among [the camps] ... as prisoners were interrogated and their 'status'
determined." Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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most prisoners were interrogated while being beaten and tortured39
with blunt instruments and knives.' Although there were fewer
beatings and summary executions at the Trnopolje camp, the women
prisoners there were regularly subjected to gang rapes.41 When a
39. See id. The severity of a prisoner's treatment was related to his or her per-
ceived status. Wealthy, intellectual, or politically active captives were subjected to
severe torture and generally did not survive. Those who had actively resisted the
Serb takeover and had escaped immediate execution were doomed to extremely
harsh beatings and abuse. Those prisoners falling into neither of these categories
were usually treated less harshly, unless they stood out for some reason. See Id.
40. The use of blunt instruments was focused on the joints of the legs, the kid-
neys, the spine, and the head. See Id. Knives were typically used to sever tendons in
the knees or ankles. See id.
41. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 15, § IV(A)(5). The Commission
found that the rape of women was prevalent, with girls as young as seven years old
and women as old as 65 being raped while in captivity. See d. § IV(E)(3). Men
were also subjected to sexual assault and mutilation, including being forced to rape
women and perform sex acts on guards or each other. See Id. § IV(F).
Examining the relationship between "ethnic cleansing" and rape, the Commission
discerned five distinct patterns. See id. § IV(F)(3). The first pattern involved sexual
assault committed in conjunction with looting and intimidation of the target ethnic
group before widespread fighting broke out. As tensions grew, small groups of men
would often break into houses, intimidate and beat the male occupants, and rape the
females. Usually a "gang atmosphere" surrounded such events, where all the attack-
ers would participate in the assault. Id. One woman interviewed by the Commis-
sion was "gang-raped by eight solders in front of her six-year-old sister and five-
month-old daughter." Id.
The second pattern consisted of sexual assault committed "in conjunction with
fighting in an area." Id. After a town or village was attacked, the inhabitants would
be assembled and divided by age and gender. Women would then be raped publicly
in front of their detained neighbors. See id.
The third pattern of rape entailed sexual assault of people in detention merely
because the victorious ethnic group had access to such people. Soldiers, guards, and
even civilians were allowed to enter prison camps, pick out women at random, take
them away and rape them, and then either kill them or return them to the camp.
One witness interviewed by the Commission saw a woman die after being in a coma
as a result of about 100 sadistic rapes by guards. Another incident related by an ex-
detainee involved male prisoners lined up naked while Serb women undressed in
front of them. If any prisoner had an erection, his penis was cut off. See Id. An-
other ex-detainee testified about seeing a father and son who shared his cell forced
by guards to perform sex acts with each other. See id.
The fourth pattern of rape involved sexual assaults against women for the purpose
of terrorizing and humiliating them as part of the policy of ethnic cleansing. See id.
Female prisoners detained for this purpose were often raped, beaten, and tortured in
front of other internees. If they became pregnant, they were detained until it was
too late to obtain an abortion. One woman who spoke to the Commission stated
that she had been detained by a Serbian soldier for six months. She was raped al-
most daily by three or four soldiers and was told that she would "give birth to a
chetnik boy who would kill Muslims when he grew up." Id.
The fifth pattern of rape involved detention of women in hotels for the sole pur-
pose of sexually entertaining soldiers, rather than causing a reaction in the women.
See id. These women were more often killed than released, unlike other women in
prison camps. See id.
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camp was so packed that no more people could be crammed in, pris-
oners were either released or executed.42
C. Establishment of the International Tribunal
On May 25, 1993, in response to worldwide outrage over the
bloodshed in the Balkans, the United Nations Security Council es-
tablished an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible
for violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugo-
slavia occurring after January 1, 199 1. 41 The culmination of a year-
long process of United Nations fact-finding and deliberation, Secur-
ity Council Resolution 8274 established the tribunal and adopted a
statute governing its structure, jurisdiction, and procedures. 4 5 It was
preceded by a number of resolutions, which, when viewed together,
show an evolutionary growth of international activism and aware-
ness. This evolution went through four stages: condemnation, pub-
lication, investigation, and punishment. 6
The Security Council condemned the alleged atrocities occurring
in the former Yugoslavia in Resolution 76447 on July 13, 1992, de-
claring international humanitarian law binding on all warring parties
and stressing that "persons who commit or order the commission of
grave breaches of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions are individually
42. See id. § IV(A)(5).
43. See James C. O'Brien, Current Developments: The International Tribunal for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J.
IN'L L. 639,639 (1993). On November 8, 1994, the Security Council voted to estab-
lish an international tribunal for crimes committed during Rwanda's 1994 civil war.
See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
See generally Stefanie Grant, The Other Tribunal (visited Jan. 16, 1997) <http.//
www.intac.com/PubService/human rights/GENOCIDE/trib/trib2.html>.
The ad hoc tribunals established by the Security Council to adjudicate violations
of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are not to
be confused with the International Court of Justice, a judicial body created by the
U.N. Charter to hear disputes between nation-states. See U.N. CHARTER, chap.
XIV, art. 92-96.
44. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
The Security Council[, ... [eixpressing once again its grave alarm at con-
tinuing reports of widespread and flagrant violations of international hu-
manitarian law occurring ... [in] the former Yugoslavia[,] . . . [d]ecides
hereby to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prose-
cuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanita-
rian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia ....
Id.
45. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), re-
printed in 32 LL.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter Statute of the International THbunal].
46. See O'Brien, supra note 43, at 640.
47. S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/764
(1992).
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responsible in respect of such breaches."'  One month later, on Au-
gust 12, 1992, the Security Council took a second step of publicizing
the reported atrocities by unanimously adopting Resolution 771,4§
which called upon states and international human rights organiza-
tions to collect documentation of human rights abuses and submit
them to the Council. 0
On October 6, 1992, without waiting for a single report to be sub-
mitted or for any recommendations from the Secretary-General, the
Security Council took the third step of investigating the alleged
atrocities through the adoption of Resolution 780,51 which estab-
lished a "Commission of Experts" to begin collecting data on human
rights violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.5 The Commission's in-
terim report, which concluded that grave breaches of international
humanitarian law had taken place in the former Yugoslavia,53 was
the catalyst for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 8081 on
February 22,1993. Resolution 808 proposed the establishment of an
international tribunal to punish individuals responsible for such vio-
lations through due process of law."5
The structure of the Tribunal consists of three principal organs:
the Chambers, the Prosecutor, and the Registry. 6 The Chambers
are comprised of two three-member Trial Chambers and a five-
48. Id. Resolution 764 stands in sharp contrast with the Security Council's previ-
ous references to the carnage in the former Yugoslavia in that it invoked specific
international agreements containing enforcement provisions and discussed the obli-
gations of individuals involved in the conflict. See O'Brien, supra note 43, at 641.
49. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S!RESM1(1992).
50. See id; see also Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 149 ("Resolution 771 also de-
manded that all military forces active in Bosnia-Herzegovina observe humanitarian
law and threatened further Security Council action to ensure compliance.").
51. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S!RESf78O
(1992).
52. See id; see also O'Brien, supra note 43, at 641. The commissioners were Pro-
fessor Frits Kalshoven, Chair; Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni; Commander William J.
Fenrick; Judge Keba M'Baye; and Professor Torkel Opsahl. See id. at n.11. The
Commission was initially beset with complications, including inadequate staffing,
funding, and disagreements over its mandate. See id. at 642. As a result, the Com-
mission was unable to actively investigate violations of international humanitarian
law until late January of 1993, when it established a practical work plan to exhume
mass grave sites and explore allegations of mass rapes and "ethnic cleansing." See
id/.
53. See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 149 n.167.
54. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES80
(1993).
55. For an interesting commentary about the International Tribunal and its strug-
gles to establish its own legitimacy, see William W. Home, The Real Trial of the
Century (visited Feb. 17, 1997) <http.//www.courttv.com/casefflesAvarcrimesreports/
realtoc.html>.
56. Statute of the International "Ilibunal, supra note 45, art. 11.
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member Appeals Chamber authorized to adjudicate cases.5 7 The
office of the Prosecutor investigates alleged violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, prepares indictments, and prosecutes those
individuals indicted.58 The Registry, responsible for public rela-
tions, storing documents and other administrative duties, acts as a
combination of a clerk's office and an archive. 9
D. The History of War Crimes Tribunals
Although precedents for the establishment of an international
war crimes tribunal exist in antiquity60 and the Middle Ages, 61 it is
57. See id. at art. 11(A)(1). The Chambers consist of 11 judges elected by the
U.N. General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council. See Id. at art.
12. Elected on September 17, 1993, the judges are: Georges Michel Abi-Saab
(Egypt), Antonio Cassese (Italy), Jules Deschenes (Canada), Adolphus Godwin
Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria), Germain Le Foyer De Costil (France), Li Haopei (China),
Abrielle Kirk McDonald (United States), Elizabeth Odie Benito (Costa Rica), Rus-
tam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), Sir Ninian Stephen (Australia), and Lal Chand Vohrah
(Malaysia). See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 151 n.182. The President of the Tri-
bunal is Judge Antonio Casesse.
58. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 45, art. 16. The Chief Prose-
cutor is Richard Goldstone, a former South African judge who was a "darling of the
antiapartheid forces." Home, supra note 55, at 6. Offered the position on July 4,
1994, Goldstone almost declined the offer because he was soon to be appointed to
South Africa's new eleven-judge Constitutional Court. See id. However, Nelson
Mandela, who thought it was important for a South African to accept such a promi-
nent international position, pushed through a constitutional amendment to hold
open Goldstone's spot on the high court until his return. See id. at 6-7.
59. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 45, art. 17. See also
Court TV Library, The Tribunal and the Law (visited Feb. 17, 1997) <http://
www.courttv.com/casefiles/warcrimes/reports/tribunal.html>.
60. Greek mythology describes how the goddess Athena, after a request to judge
a dispute between mortals, declared herself unqualified and recommended that "the
divine law and the gods themselves should be subject to a human court composed of
the 'best of the city,' ... an 'institution permanente."' ROBERT K. WOnTZEL, THE
NUREMBURG TRIALs i INTERNAnONAL LAW 18 (2nd ed. 1962). Ancient Greek
history also tells of a Lacedaemonian admiral by the name of Lysander, who called
together his allies after the destruction of an Athenian fleet at Aegospotamos in 405
B.C. to determine the fate of prisoners. See id. at 17. Supposedly, the allies acted as
a kind of court that heard witnesses and examined evidence before executing all of
the prisoners, save the one who had betrayed his side to the Spartans. See id. at 17-
18. However, the dearth of even a pretense at such "ordered and reasoned judg-
ment" throughout most of classical history caused Woetzel to conclude that "mod-
em international law has no direct roots in antiquity, and any connection between
these two epochs would be extremely vague and tenuous, as far as the law of nations
is concerned." Id. at 19.
61. In 1469, the Archduke of Austria was forced, due to financial difficulties, to
pledge his possessions on the Upper Rhine to Duke Charles of Burgundy. See Id.
Duke Charles installed Sir Peter of Hagenbach as Governor of the fortified town of
Breisach, one of these possessions. See id. Hagenbach instituted a reign of terror,
and his crimes were unique in their ferocity even in those rough and dangerous
times. See id. Austria, France, and the towns and knights of the Upper Rhine later
united to defeat Duke Charles and his plans for conquest. See id, at 19-20.
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the twentieth-century experience after World Wars I and II that
sheds the most light on the political and practical difficulties the
present-day International Tribunal faces. In 1919, after the First
World War, the victorious Allied powers appointed the Commission
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforce-
ment of Penalties6' to determine the extent to which Axis powers
violated the laws of war; assess the level of individual responsibility;
and draft a statute for a war crimes tribunal.6 The Commission rec-
ommended that any peace treaty provide for an international tribu-
nal to prosecute war criminals, and defined four categories of acts
deemed war crimes: (1) offenses committed in prison camps against
prisoners of war;, (2) offenses committed by superior officers who
issued orders; (3) offenses committed by all persons of authority
who failed to stop violations of the laws of war, and (4) any other
offenses that national courts should not be allowed to adjudicate."
The Allies incorporated these recommendations to a limited ex-
tent into the Treaty of Versailles, requiring Germany to surrender
high-ranking military figures for war crimes trials, including the
German Kaiser Wilheim II.' However, those treaty provisions re-
lating to war crimes tribunals ultimately proved to be unworkable in
the post-war political context.'f By the end of the war in 1918, pub-
Hagenbach was captured on May 4, 1474, and was tried in the marketplace of
Breisach for the crimes he had committed as Governor. See id. at 20. The court
consisted of judges from Austria and allied cities as well as sixteen knights. See id.
The court rejected Hagenbach's preliminary objection to the court's jurisdiction and
his defense of superior orders, and sentenced him to death. See Id. Thus, the trial of
Sir Peter of Hagenbach resembles modem war crimes trials, with respect to jurisdic-
tional objections and the plea of superior orders. See Id.
62. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforce-
ment of Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29,
1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J. I'brL L. 95 (1920).
63. See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 133-34. At the end of World War I, the
major international treaties relating to the laws of war were the two Hague Conven-
tions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and 1907. See id. at 135
.100.
64. See id. at 134-35.
65. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, 11 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(ser. 3) 323, reprinted in 13 ANL J. IN'L L 151 (Supp. 1919) (official documents).
66. See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 131. The formal indictment of the Ger-
man Kaiser was opposed by the United States, which argued that heads of state were
protected by sovereign immunity and were responsible only to their own domestic
judicial system. See id. at 135 n.101. Interestingly, the German Kaiser had abdicated
control of the German government and fled to the Netherlands after the war. When
it became apparent that dissension among the Allies would prevent the Kaiser from
ever being arrested, a group of American solders led by Colonel Luke Lea, a former
United States senator, attempted to abduct the Kaiser and bring him to Paris. See
id. at 136 n.105. Although they succeeded in gaining entry to the estate where the
Kaiser was residing, they were forced to withdraw after being surrounded by Dutch
troops. See id.
67. See id. at 135.
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lic enthusiasm for war crimes trials had waned and the victorious
Allies found themselves unable to remain united in their commit-
ment to such trials.' When civil war and revolution shook Ger-
many, the possible spread of Bolshevism and general unrest became
more immediate concerns of the Allies.69 Because the idea of en-
forcing the war crimes provisions of the Treaty of Versailles was
eventually abandoned by the Allies, Germany was permitted to try
accused war criminals itself.70 These trials, however, conducted in
1921 at Leipzig, resulted in few convictions and light sentences.71
It was not until the tragic experiences of World War II that the
historic idea of punishing war criminals took real effect.' After
much internal debate,73 the Allies signed the London Agreement 74
on August 8, 1945, which established an International Military Tri-
bunal in Nuremburg for the trial and punishment of war criminals of
the European Axis.' Wary of the unsuccessful precedent set by the
World War I efforts to prosecute war criminals, the Allies, particu-
larly the United States, devoted substantial resources to the
Nuremburg trials.76 With the aid of abundant documentation of war
crimes maintained by the Axis powers themselves, 77 the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal convicted nineteen of the twenty-two major
offenders who were tried.7 s
68. See id. at 136-37.
69. See id. at 138.
70. See id.
71. See id. The Allies originally demanded the surrender of 854 men for prosecu-
tion. Eventually, the Allies directed Germany to try 45 men, of whom 12 were actu-
ally tried and six convicted. T1wo of those convicted later escaped prison. See Id. at
133 n.89.
72. See Dennis J. Mitchell, All Is Not Fair in War: The Need for a Permanent War
Crimes Tribunal, 44 DRAKE L. REv. 575, 581-82 (1996).
73. Winston Churchill argued that "the method of trial, conviction and judicial
sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler,
Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop ... [for] the question of their fate is a political
and not a judicial one." Cable from Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt (Au-
gust 22,1944), in 3 CHURCHIL & RoosEvELT-THm CormLETr CORRESPONDENCE
329 (Warren F. Kimball ed., 1st paperback prtg. 1987) (1984). Instead, Churchill
advocated that, if such persons are apprehended, "the nearest General Officer will
convene a Court for the sole purpose of establishing their identity, and when this has
been done will have them shot within one hour without reference to higher author-
ity." Id. Churchill eventually abandoned his position in light of Josef Stalin's insis-
tence on war crimes trials. See id.
74. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremburg
Charter].
75. The Allies also organized courts and conducted trials in Tokyo for the prose-
cution of Japanese war criminals. See generally RICHARD H. MINmAR, Vic'roRs'
JusTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRimEs TRIAL (1971) (questioning the validity of the
Tokyo war crimes trials).
76. See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 141 & n.131.
77. See id. at 141.
78. See Mitchell, supra note 72, at 584.
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The Nuremburg trials and the charter that authorized them were
a turning point in the history of international law and marked a
transition "which roughly corresponds to that in the evolution of
local law when men ceased to punish local crime by 'hue and cry'
and began to let reason and inquiry govern punishment."79 The
Nuremburg Charter identified three types of crimes: (1) crimes
against peace,80 (2) war crimes,81 and (3) crimes against humanitya 2
At the time of the Nuremburg trials, however, only the laws and
customs of war were firmly established in international law; crimes
against "peace" and "humanity" were new conceptsYp Since 1945,
international humanitarian law has codified the concept of "war
crimes" and "crimes against humanity,"' making individual crimi-
nal responsibility one of the most significant legacies of the
Nuremburg trials and providing a legal precedent for the Interna-
tional Tribunal.
79. ROBERT F. JACKSON, Tim NORNBERG CASE 8 (Alfred Knopf ed., Cooper
Square Publishing 1971) (1947) (excerpt from Robert Jackson's closing address for
the United States at the Nuremburg trials).
80. See Nuremburg Charter, supra note 74, art. 6(a) (defining crimes against
peace as "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing").
81. See id. art. 6(b) (defining war crimes as "violations of the law or customs or
war" including, but not limited to "murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave la-
bour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hos-
tages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity").
82. See id. art 6(c) (defining crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or in persecutions on political, racial or reli-
gious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where
perpetrated").
83. See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 142. Thus, the Nuremburg trials have
been criticized for being an exercise of arbitrary victors' justice, for being unfairly ex
post facto, and for violating the criminal law doctrine of nuilum crinen sine lege,
nuba poena sine lege ("unless there is a law, there can be no crime; unless there is a
law, there can be no punishment"). See 1d. at 142 & n.141 (quoting Mnm.R, supra
note 75, at 61). See also ViscouNr MAuGHAh, U.N.O. AND WAR Cimms (Green-
wood Press 1975) (1951) (condemning the prosecution of crimes against humanity
and crimes against peace at Nuremburg).
84. See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 143. In 1946 the United Nations General
Assembly unanimously affirmed the principles of international law recognized by
the Nuremburg Charter. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law
Recognized by the Charter of Nuremburg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st
Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64Add.1 (1946). Nevertheless, the concept of "crimes
against peace" remains in an uncertain position in international law. See Hochkam-
mer, supra note 3, at 144 n.149.
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III. THE SUBJECT CASE
Dusko TadicO5 is a Bosnian Serb accused of participating in the
collection, mistreatment, and killing of Bosnian Muslims and Croats
in Bosnia-Herzegovina between May 24, 1992, and August 30,
1992.86 A former cocktail lounge owner and karate instructor, Tadic
is married, has two daughters, and by all accounts enjoyed good re-
lations with Muslims and Croats before the war.' However, Tadic
allegedly became "intoxicated with Serbian nationalistic propa-
ganda" in the months preceding the breakup of Yugoslavia. 8 He
banned Muslims from his cafe, and helped compile death lists of
intellectuals, politicians, and other prominent Muslims who were to
be killed as part of the Serb ethnic cleansing of the Prijedor
region.89
When hostilities broke out, Tadic became a de facto leader of
Serb paramilitary forces, assisting them in "evacuating" Muslims
and Croats and marching them to local prison camps.90 During one
such march, Tadic and a group of Serbs allegedly pushed four pris-
oners out of a column, lined them up against a wall, and shot them. 91
Inside the camp of Omarska, Tadic is said to have routinely beaten,
tortured, and executed prisoners. The most infamous incident Tadic
is alleged to have committed was assisting a group of Serbs to se-
verely beat four prisoners and forcing one of them to castrate an-
other with his mouth. 2
Having allegedly looted many Muslim homes during the course of
the conflict, Tadic had a lot of cash but no place to spend it.93 Tadic
decided to move to Munich, Germany, where he could spend his
new-found wealth and stay with a brother.94 However, refugees
from the prison camps living in Germany identified Tadic to the
German authorities, who arrested him in February of 1994.95 On
November 7, 1994, Tadic was indicted in Germany on charges of
murder and torture for his activities in Bosnia.96 On November 8,
1994, the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal formally re-
85. Dusko Tadic is also known as "Dusan" or "Dule" Tadic. See Indictment of
Tadic (visited Jan. 18, 1997) <gopher//gopher.ig.apc.org:7030/00/CasesfThdic/
950213-Tadic-indictment>.
86. See id.
87. See Court TV Library, The Defendant and the Charges (visited Feb. 17, 1997)
<http:/www.courttv.com/casefiles/warcrimes/reports/defendant.html>.
88. See id.
89. See Keegan Declaration, supra note 16.
90. See id.
91. See The Defendant and the Charges, supra note 87.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. See also Home, supra note 55.
95. See Home, supra note 55, at 11.
96. See Court TV Library, Chronology (visited Feb. 17, 1997) <http'/
www.courttv.com/casefiles/warcrimes/reports/chronology.html>. Germany's author-
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quested that the Trial Chamber ask Germany to defer prosecution
of Tadic to the Tribunal.97 Along with twenty-one other Serbs, he
was formally indicted on February 13, 1995, for various violations of
international humanitarian law.98 However, it was not until March
31, 1995, that the German parliament passed a law permitting the
transfer of the case to the International Tribuna 99 On April 24,
1995, Tadic was transferred from Germany to a detention facility
run by the Tribunal at The Hague, and on April 26, Tadic plead not
guilty, stating, "I did not take part in any of the crimes with which I
am charged."'
On June 23, 1995, the defense filed a preliminary motion seeking
dismissal of all charges against the accused based on the Interna-
tional Tribunal's lack of jurisdiction.' 0' The defense challenged the
Tribunal's power to try Tadic on three major points: the improper
establishment of the International Tribunal; the improper grant of
primacy over national courts; and the lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion."c The Prosecutor disputed each of these points and con-
tended that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the accused as
ity to prosecute Tadic for crimes committed in Bosnia was premised on various in-
ternational treaties to which Germany was a signatory. See id.
97. See I J. Goldstone et al., An Applicatdon for Deferral by the Federal Republic
of Germany in the Matter of Dusko Tadic (visited Jan. 18, 1997) <gopherJIgo-
pher.igc.apc.org:7030/00/casesfMdicrlTdic-deferral>. International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991; see also
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.I.M. 493
(1994) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence]. Rule 9 provides, in part:
Where it appears to the Prosecutor that in any such investigations or crimi-
nal proceedings instituted in the national courts of any State ... what is in
issue is closely related to, or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal
questions which may have implications for investigations or prosecutions
before the Tribunal, the Prosecutor may propose to the Trial Chamber...
that a formal request be made that the national court defer to the compe-
tence of the Tribunal.
Id.
The Prosecutor supported his request with 13 pieces of documentary evidence-
maps, newspaper clippings, and photographs-and 19 statements from witnesses
scattered throughout Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
See Home, supra note 55. It has been noted that "[i]n addition to the practical effect
of granting the tribunal exclusive jurisdiction, deferral proceedings are a potent pub-
lic relations tool, permitting the prosecution to air unsubstantiated charges against
individuals prior to their indictment and signaling the tribunal's imminent indict-
ment of those accused in local war crimes proceedings." Id.
98. See Hochkammer, supra note 3, at 172.
99. See Chronology, supra note 96, at 1.
100. Id.
101. See Prosecutor v. Tadic (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. Trial Cham-
ber, Aug. 10, 1995) <gopherJgopher.igc.apc.org7030I10caseTadic95031-Tadic-
decision>.
102. See id.
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charged. °3 On August 10, 1995, the Trial Chamber dismissed the
defense motion with respect to primacy and subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and refused to examine the validity of its creation by the Secur-
ity Council. 1°4 From this judgment the defense filed a timely
interlocutory appeal.10 5
The first issue before the Appeals Chamber was to determine
which issues raised by the defense motion were properly appealable
in an interlocutory proceeding. Based on the distinction drawn by
the Trial Chamber between the validity of the creation of the Inter-
national Tribunal and its jurisdiction, the Prosecutor contended that
only the jurisdictional aspects of the defense motion were entitled to
interlocutory appeal."°6 The Appeals Chamber rejected "[t]his nar-
row interpretation of the concept of jurisdiction," finding that "[a]ll
the grounds of contestation relied upon by Appellant result... in an
assessment of the legal capability of the International Tribunal to try
his case. What is this, if not in the end a question of jurisdiction?"'"
Accordingly, with respect to interlocutory appeals, the Appeals
Chamber determined that the term "jurisdiction" encompassed an
objection based on the invalidity of the Tribunal's establishment,
and concluded that it had the power to rule on all aspects of Tadic's
motion. 1
The Appeals Chamber proceeded to consider the substantive
merits of the appeal, beginning with Tadic's first argument attacking
the validity of the establishment of the International Tribunal.1
103. See id. The Government of the United States of America also submitted a
brief as amicus curiae. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32 (Int'l Crim. Thb. for the former Yugo.
App. Chamber 1995).
106. See id. at 39. Pursuant to Article 15 of the Statute of the International Tri-
bunal, supra note 44, the judges of the International libunal promulgated rules of
procedure and evidence. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 97. Rule
73(A)(i) empowers those accused of crimes to make preliminary motions based on
lack of jurisdiction; Rule 72(B) provides that "[t]he Trial Chamber shall dispose of
preliminary motions in limine litis and without interlocutory appeal, save in the case
of dismissal of an objection based on lack of jurisdiction." Id.
107. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 38. The Appeals Chamber noted the Prose-
cutor's concession at oral argument that "Rule 72 ... is a provision which achieves
justice because but for it... one could have the unfortunate position of having
months of trial... only to find out at the appeal stage that ... there should not have
been a trial at all because of some lack of jurisdiction ... ." Id. at 37. While finding
this policy observation to be "by no means conclusive" with respect to whether a
challenge to the legitimacy of the Tibunal's foundation was within the meaning of
"jurisdiction" as used in Rule 72(B), the Appeals Chamber opined that "in a court
of law, common sense ought to be honoured not only when facts are weighed, but
equally when laws are surveyed and the proper rule is selected." Id. at 38.
108. See id at 38.
109. See id
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Reaffirming its broad interpretation of "jurisdiction,""' the Ap-
peals Chamber examined the legitimacy of Tadic's motion in light of
two different arguments advanced by the Prosecutor and approved
by the Trial Chamber. (1) the Tribunal did not have the authority to
review its establishment by the Security Council, and (2) the issues
raised by Tadic were non-justiciable "political questions." ''
Recognizing that the Tribunal's "primary" or "substantive" juris-
diction did not include the express authority to examine its own cre-
ation,"U the Appeals Chamber nevertheless determined that it had
"jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction" by virtue of its very
existence as a judicial body." 3 The Appeals Chamber found such
incidental jurisdiction to be a "well-entrenched principle of general
international law" that could only be limited by an express provision
in its implementing instrument." ' The Appeals Chamber also re-
jected the contention that the validity of the Tribunal's establish-
ment was a so-called "political" or "non-justiciable" question.
110. Refuting the Trial Chamber's implication that jurisdiction was limited to
questions of time, space, persons charged, and subject matter, the Appeals Chamber
found that "jurisdiction is not merely an ambit or sphere... [but rather is] a legal
power.. . 'to state the law' . . . within this ambit, in an authoritative and final
manner." Id. The Appeals Chamber concluded that:
[1]f the International Tibunal were not validly constituted, it would lack
the legitimate power to decide in time or space or over any person or sub-
ject-matter. The plea based on the invalidity of constitution of the Interna-
tional Tribunal goes to the very essence of jurisdiction as a power to
exercise the judicial function within any ambit. ... This issue is a prelimi-
nary to and conditions all other aspects of jurisdiction.
Id. at 39.
111. Id.
112. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 IL.M. at 40. Article 1 of the International Tribu-
nal's statute is entitled "Competence of the International Tribunal" and provides
that "[tlhe International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons respon-
sible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the
present Statute." Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 45, art. 1.
113. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 LL.M. at 41. The Appeals Chamber expounded that:
RTo envisage the International Tribunal exclusively as a "subsidiary organ"
of the Security Council... remaining totally in its power and at its mercy
[would be a mistake] .... [The Security Council not only decided to estab-
lish a subsidiary organ . ., it also clearly intended to establish a special
kind of "subsidiary organ": a tribunal
Id. at 39.
114. Id. at 40.
Mhe principle of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz." in German or "/a competence
de la competence" in French... is a necessary component in the exercise of
the judicial function.... In international law, where there is no integrated
judicial system and where every judicial or arbitral organ needs a specific
constitutive instrument defining its jurisdiction, "the first obligation of the
Court-as of any other judicial body-is to ascertain its own competence."
Id. (quoting Advisory Opinion on Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the
LL.O. upon complaints made against the U.N.E.S.C.O., 1956 LCJ. 77, 163 (Advi-
sory Opinion of October 23) (Cordova, J., dissenting)).
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Describing the "political questions" doctrine as having "receded
from the horizon of contemporary international law," the Appeals
Chamber concluded that as long as the case before it turned upon a
"legal question capable of a legal answer," it was bound to exercise
its jurisdiction regardless of the political implications." 5
The Appeals Chamber next addressed the substantive aspects of
Tadic's argument that the Tribunal had been unlawfully established.
Cautioning that the Security Council's authority was not absolute," 6
the Appeals Chamber nevertheless observed that the Security
Council had wide discretion under Article 39 of the Charter of the
United Nations to maintain and restore international peace and se-
curity." 7 Tadic argued that the establishment of an international
tribunal was never contemplated by the framers of the Charter as a
measure to be taken under Chapter VII."8 The Appeals Chamber
rejected this argument, finding that the foundation of such a tribunal
fell within the powers of the Security Council under Article 41.111
115. Id. at 41.
116. "The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, estab-
lished by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organiza-
tion .... [N]either the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security
Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law)." Id. at 42.
In supporting this observation, the Appeals Chamber pointed to Article 24 of the
U.N. Charter. Article 24(1) confers upon the Security Council the "primary respon-
sibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"; Article 24(2) states
that, "'[i]n discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to
the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI,
VII, VIII, and XII."' Id at 42 (quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 24, paras. 1 & 2). Thus,
the Appeals Chamber concluded, "[t]he Charter... speaks the language of specific
powers, not of absolute fiat." Id
117. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is entitled "Action with Respect to Threats
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Article 39 begins
Chapter VII and provides that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Arti-
cles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHAR-
TER, art. 39.
With respect to the range of measures envisaged under Chapter VII for the pres-
ervation or restoration of international peace and security, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that "the language of Article 39 is quite clear as to the channelling of the
very broad and exceptional powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII
through articles 41 and 42." Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 43.
118. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 44.
119. See id. at 44-45. Article 41 provides that:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of commu-
nication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 41.
LEGITIMIZING THE TRIBUNAL
The Appeals Chamber determined that the establishment of the In-
ternational Tribunal was a "measure not involving the use of armed
force" and that the economic and political examples given were
merely illustrative and did not exclude other measures. °
Tadic's argument that the Security Council, being an executive or-
gan, was inherently incapable of creating a judicial organ was simi-
larly dismissed as stemming "from a fundamental misunderstanding
of the constitutional set-up of the Charter." 1 According to the
Appeals Chamber, the Security Council exercised both decision-
making and executive powers in fulfilling its responsibility to main-
tain international peace and security.' Accordingly, the establish-
ment of a judicial organ was merely an instrument for the
attainment of this objective and signified neither a "delegation" of
Security Council authority nor a "usurpation" of judicial functions
properly belonging to some other organ of the United Nations-'
Tadic also challenged the Tribunal's establishment as being con-
trary to the fundamental canon of international jurisprudence that
an individual charged with a crime be tried by a court that has been
"established by law."' 4 The defense argued that the words "estab-
lished by law" meant established by a legislature 2 s While finding
this construction applicable in the context of national legal systems,
the Appeals Chamber concluded that it was inapplicable to an in-
ternational court constituted under the auspices of the United Na-
tions.' Rather, the Appeals Chamber found the more sensible
120. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 44-45. The Appeals Chamber declined
to accept Tadic's contention that Article 41 measures were measures solely to be
undertaken by Member States (which would exclude the establishment of an inter-
national tribunal), stating that "[lIogically, if the [United Nations] can undertake
measures which have to be implemented through the intermediary of its Members, it
can afortiori undertake measures which it can implement directly via its organs, if it
happens to have the resources to do so." Id. at 45.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 46. Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides that "[iln the determination of any criminal charge against him, or
of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14,
para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176. Similar provisions can be found in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
the American Convention on Human Rights. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 1-M. at
46.
125. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 46. This "separation of powers" inter-
pretation has been favored by the European Commission of Human Rights and is
intended to ensure that the administration of criminal justice is regulated by laws
emanating from the legislature, rather than orders issuing from the executive. See
id.
126. "It is clear that the legislative, executive and judicial division of powers...
does not apply to the international setting nor... to the setting of an international
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interpretation of the phrase "established by law" in the international
setting to be the requirement that a tribunal be established in ac-
cordance with the "rule of law," meaning that it be constituted pur-
suant to "proper international standards .. .provid[ing] all the
guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full conform-
ity with internationally recognized human rights instruments.,1
2 7
Tadic's second major argument on appeal challenged the pur-
ported primacy of the International Tribunal over national courts,128
asserting that any such primacy unduly infringed upon the sover-
eignty of states directly affected by the conflict.129 Diverging from
the general principle of international law that individuals have no
standing to plead violations of state sovereignty,130 the Appeals
Chamber ruled that this principle had "suffered progressive erosion
at the hands of more liberal forces at work in the democratic socie-
ties" such that "an accused, being entitled to a full defence, cannot
be deprived of a plea so intimately connected with... international
law as a defence based on violation of State sovereignty."' 131 Tadic
argued that no state could assume jurisdiction to prosecute crimes
committed on the territory of another state absent a "universal in-
terest" recognized by international law. 132 The Appeals Chamber
organization such as the United Nations." Id. Foreseeing this line of reasoning,
Tadic contended that "given the differences between the United Nations system and
national division of powers,. . . the conclusion must be that the United Nations
system is not capable of creating the International Tribunal unless there is an
amendment to the United Nations Charter." Id. at 47. The Appeals Chamber dis-
agreed, finding instead that the Security Council was empowered under Article 41 to
establish an international tribunal to restore and maintain international peace and
security. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
127. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 IL.M. at 47.
128. Article 9 of the International Tribunal's statute states:
1. The International Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1
January 1991.
2. The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts.
At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally re-
quest national courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribu-
nal in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Tribunal.
Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 45, at art. 9.
129. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 IL.M. at 48.
130. See Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 62 (Isr. D.C. 1961) affd 36 I.L.R. 277,
291-93 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962) ("The right to plead violation of the sovereignty of a State is
the exclusive right of that State. Only a sovereign State may raise the plea or waive
it, and the accused has no right to take over the rights of that State.").
131. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 IL.M. at 50.
132. See id. The Supreme Court of Israel explained in Eichmann that "universal
crimes" are those acts which "violate the universal moral values and humanitarian
principles that lie hidden in the criminal law systems adopted by civilised nations
.... [hey involve the perpetration of an international crime which all the nations
of the world are interested in preventing." Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 291-93.
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found just such a universal interest, stating that the "offences ... if
proven, do not affect the interests of one State alone but shock the
conscience of mankind."1 33 Thus, the Appeals Chamber affirmed
the principle of the International Tribunal's primacy over national
courts.
Tadic's third argument on appeal attacked the subject matter ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal, contending that the authority of the Tribu-
nal was limited to crimes committed in the context of an
international armed conflict.3' Tadic argued that there was no
armed conflict in the region where the crimes were allegedly com-
mitted,1-5 or in the alternative, that the alleged crimes occurred dur-
ing an internal armed conflict.1m The prosecutor responded that the
Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged crimes, whether
the strife was characterized as internal or internationaL"
Tadic's contention that there did not exist a "legally cognizable
armed conflict" rested on a notion of armed conflict that encom-
passed only the precise time and place of actual hostilities.1m The
Appeals Chamber rejected this line of reasoning, ruling that the
temporal and geographical scope of armed conflicts was broad and
extended beyond the exact time and place of hostilities.13 9 The Ap-
peals Chamber found it sufficient that the alleged crimes were
closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the terri-
tories controlled by various parties to the conflict.14 °
With respect to the characterization of the armed conflict, the Ap-
peals Chamber concluded that the hostilities in the former Yugosla-
The United States Supreme Court has noted that the crime of piracy is "an offence
against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human
race." U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153,161 (1820). Other acts traditionally considered to
be universal crimes include enslavement and the trade of women and minors, see
Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 LL.M. at 51, and since World War H, genocide. See Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
133. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.LM. at 51. The Appeals Chamber averred that:
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for jus-
tice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised suc-
cessfully against human rights. Borders should not be considered as a
shield against the reach of the law and as a protection for those who tram-
ple underfoot the most elementary rights of humanity.
Id. at 52.
134. See id. at 53.
135. See id. The defense claimed that the conflict in the Prijedor region was lim-
ited to a political assumption of power by the Bosnian Serbs and did not involve
armed combat. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 54.
139. "[W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authori-
ties and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State." Id.
140. See id. at 55.
1997]
598 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:577
via had both internal and international aspects, that the Security
Council had both aspects in mind when it established the Interna-
tional Tribunal, and that the Security Council "intended to empower
the International Tribunal to adjudicate violations of humanitarian
law that occurred in either context.' 14 1 On the basis of that conclu-
sion, the Appeals Chamber proceeded to interpret the three articles
of its Statute named in Tadic's indictment.
Regarding Article 2,142 the Appeals Chamber observed that the
"grave breaches" provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 143 cre-
ated "universal mandatory criminal jurisdiction" among the signa-
tory states only with respect to certain specified acts committed in
international armed conflicts." Accordingly, the Appeals Chain-
141. Id. at 57. The Appeals Chamber found that the Security Council's ultimate
purpose in establishing the International Tribunal was "bringing to justice persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia" without reference to whether the conflicts were internal or interna-
tional, thus "deterring future violations and contributing to the re-establishment of
peace and security in the region." Id. at 55. According to this "teleological interpre-
tation of the statute," id, the Appeals Chamber determined that the Security Coun-
cil had purposely refrained from classifying the armed conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia to avoid binding the International Tribunal in its adjudications. See Id. at
57.
142. Article 2 of the International THbunal's statute provides:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons com-
mitting or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
vention of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or
property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva
Convention:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a
hostile power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and
regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
Statute of the International Tibunal, supra note 45, at art. 2.
143. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Geneva
Convention I); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 (Geneva Convention II); Convention Relative to the 'Teatment of Pris-
oners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Geneva Convention
III); and the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
144. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 58. In so holding, the Appeals Cham-
ber noted that "[tihe international armed conflict requirement was a necessary limi-
tation on the grave breaches system in light of the intrusion on State sovereignty
that such mandatory universal jurisdiction represents." Id. at 59.
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ber concluded that Article 2 of the Statute applied only to offences
committed within the context of international armed conflicts, find-
ing such an interpretation "the only one warranted by the text of the
Statute and the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions, as
well as by a logical construction of their interplay as dictated by Ar-
ticle 2.'14 5
With respect to Article 3,146 the Appeals Chamber observed that
it was based upon the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), 47 its annexed
regulations, and the Nuremburg Thbunal's interpretation of those
regulations."4 While noting that the expression "violations of the
laws or customs of war" was a legal term of art confined in the past
to interstate armed conflict, the Appeals Chamber decided that the
1949 Geneva Conventions and "the influence of human rights doc-
trines on the law of armed conflict" had broadened the scope of the
expression to include other infringements of international humanita-
rian law.149 The court further held that Article 3 was a residual
clause that conferred on the International Tribunal jurisdiction over
any serious offence against international humanitarian law not cov-
ered by Articles 2, 4, or 5.111 Thus, the Appeals Chamber deter-
145. Id. at 59. The United States had flatly stated in its aricus curiae brief that
"the 'grave breaches' provisions of Article 2 of the International Tribunal Statute
apply to armed conflicts of a non-international character as well as those of an inter-
national character." Id. The Appeals Chamber, while finding this unsupported
statement by "one of the permanent members of the Security Council" to be an
important indication of the recent trend in state practice towards extending the
grave breaches provisions to internal conflicts, nevertheless concluded that "in the
present state of development of the law, Article 2 of the Statute only applies to
offences committed within the context of international armed conflicts." Id. at 59-
60.
146. Article 3 of the International Tribunal's statute provides that:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not
be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering,
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity,
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, vil-
lages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated
to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monu-
ments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 45, at art. 3.
147. Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
148. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 LLM. at 60.
149. See i&. at 60.
150. See id. at 61. The court opined that the residual nature of Article 3 took
effect when there was a serious infringement of a rule of international humanitarian
law that entailed, under customary or binding treaty law, individual criminal respon-
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mined that the character of the conflict as international or internal
was irrelevant to the applicability of Article 3.15'
Article 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal explicitly
confers jurisdiction over crimes committed in either internal or in-
ternational armed conflicts."5 2 Tadic argued that customary interna-
tional law required a nexus between such "crimes against humanity"
and an international armed conflict, and therefore, Article 5 "consti-
tute[d] an ex post facto law violating the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege."' 3 The Appeals Chamber dismissed this argument, find-
ing that it was a "settled rule of customary international law that
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to interna-
tional armed conflict." '154 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber found
that Article 5 could be "invoked as a basis of jurisdiction over
crimes committed in either internal or international armed
conflicts."155
IV. LEGITIMIZING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL AND INTERPRETING ITS GOVERNING
STATUTE
The two different approaches taken by the Trial Chamber and the
Appeals Chamber with respect to examining the validity of the Tri-
bunal's establishment by the Security Council illustrate the difficult
jurisdictional issues that face international courts. The Trial Cham-
ber held that Tadic's argument attacking the lawfulness of the Tribu-
nal's creation was not truly a jurisdictional issue and was therefore
sibility. See id. at 62. The court then engaged in a long discussion concerning which
customary rules of international humanitarian law were criminal in nature and appli-
cable to internal armed conflicts. See id. at 62-71.
151. See id. at 71.
152. Article 5 of the International THbunal's statute states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any ci-
vilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 45, at art. 5.
153. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 72. Nullum crinen sine lege translates to
"unless there is a law, there can be no crime." See supra note 83.
154. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 72.
155. Id. The Appeals Chamber concluded by dismissing Tadic's interlocutory ap-
peal, thus sending the case back to the Trial Chamber. See id. at 73.
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beyond its competence.156 The Appeals Chamber held otherwise,
noting that such a narrow concept of jurisdiction was inconsistent
with "a modem vision of the administration of justice."'"s
Central to the Appeals Chamber's reasoning was the practical no-
tion that if the legitimacy of the Tribunal's establishment could be
raised on appeal after conviction on the merits, it made sense to deal
with such an issue before trial.'5 The practical benefits of this ob-
servation with respect to judicial economy are readily apparent." 9
Nevertheless, one scholar has suggested that the Appeals Chamber
could have just as easily held that the validity of the Tribunal's es-
tablishment was neither a jurisdictional issue nor a justiciable one,
thereby forever closing this line of attack from the defendant." In
terms of upholding the legitimacy of the International Tribunal,
however, the approach of the Appeals Chamber is important be-
cause it emphasizes the right of the accused individuaL16' Consider-
ing the massive deprivation of liberty that conviction by a criminal
tribunal entails, it is "reassuring to know that it finds inherent to the
156. The Trial Chamber declared:
[Mt is one thing for the Security Council to have taken every care to ensure
that a structure appropriate to the conduct of fair trials has been created; it
is an entirely different thing in any way to infer from that careful structur-
ing that it was intended that the International Tribunal be empowered to
question the legality of the law which established it. The competence of
the International Tribunal is precise and narrowly defined; as described in
Article 1 of its Statute, it is to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law, subject to spatial and tempo-
ral limits, and to do so in accordance with the Statute. That is the full
extent of the competence of the International Tribunal.
Prosecutor v. Tadic (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. Trial Chamber Aug. 10,
1995) <gopher:lgopher.ig.apc.org:7030/00/cases/Tadit950310-Tadic-decision>.
This line of logic was approved in advance by at least one commentator. See
O'Brien, supra note 43, at 643 ("The tribunal may-and probably should-decide
that it lacks the power to consider the legitimacy of the Security Council's actions to
establish it, because this would require that it construe the powers of the Security
Council.").
157. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 38. See George H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of
the Intenational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 90 AM. J. hIN'L L 64
(1996).
158. See Aldrich, supra note 157, at 64. See also supra note 107.
159. In the United States, certain jurisdictional objections can be made at any
time during criminal proceedings. See FED. R. CriM. P. 12(b)(2) (The prosecution's
failure to "show jurisdiction in the court... shall be noticed by the court at any time
during the pendency of the proceedings."). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)
("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.").
160. See Aldrich, supra note 157, at 64.
161. See id. at 64-65. One of the criticisms of the Nuremburg trials was that de-
fendants were foreclosed from challenging the authority of the Military Tribunal.
See Nuremburg Charter, supra note 74. By affording defendants the opportunity to
challenge its authority, the Tribunal may avoid the perception of being a "victors'
court" that has plagued the Nuremburg proceedings.
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exercise of its judicial function the jurisdiction to examine the legal-
ity of its establishment." 162
Concerning the validity of its establishment, the Appeals Cham-
ber decided that the Security Council had the power under Article
41 of chapter VII of the Charter to establish a judicial body, and
that the Tribunal was constituted with the appropriate procedural
safeguards to provide a fair trial.163 From a literal perspective, the
use of the word "may" in Article 41164 of the Charter certainly gives
the Security Council discretion to choose what measures "not in-
volving the use of force" are to be employed in effectuating its deci-
sions. Article 29 also gives the Security Council the authority to
establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the per-
formance of its functions.16 5 "Furthermore, international humanita-
rian law itself specifies that violations are to be redressed in
accordance with due process."'" Coupled with the Security Coun-
cil's broad and unique mandate as the global community's flagship
institution in preserving and restoring international peace and secur-
ity, it is not difficult to see why the Appeals Chamber held that the
Council can prescribe a judicial measure when such a remedy is best
suited to address the specific problem at hand. 67
It is true that the establishment of the International Tribunal was
a step unprecedented by past Security Council or even United Na-
tions action.'16  This observation, rather than supporting the defend-
ant's contention that the establishment of a tribunal was never
envisioned by the framers of the Charter, 69 is a testament to the
162. See Aldrich, supra note 157, at 65.
163. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
164. "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions ... ." U.N. CHARTER,
art. 41. See supra note 119 for the full text of Article 41.
165. The full text of Article 29 reads: "The Security Council may establish such
subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." U.N.
CHARTER art. 29.
166. O'Brien, supra note 43, at 643. The 1949 Geneva Conventions provide that
it is a grave breach to deprive prisoners of the rights of a fair trial. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
167. Since the Security Council is explicitly given the power to authorize drastic
measures such as the use of armed force or the suspension of commerce between
states, one commentator has suggested that "it would be odd if it could not take the
lesser, surgical step of ameliorating a threat to international peace and security by
providing for the prosecution of individuals who violate well-established interna-
tional law." O'Brien, supra note 43, at 643.
168. Prior war crimes trials, including those at Nuremburg, were not conducted
under the authority of the United Nations Charter, but rather were conducted by ad
hoc tribunals established by victorious states, or by national tribunals. See Sean D.
Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security
After the Cold War, 32 COLWM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 242 (1994).
169. In evaluating this proposition, it is to be noted that the four key players in
the framing of the Charter who subsequently became permanent members of the
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political inertia that plagued the Security Council throughout the
Cold War era. These "bipolar tensions" frustrated efforts by the Se-
curity Council to fulfill its mission, and "thereby preclud[ed]
through practice the 'fleshing out' of means for implementing Chap-
ter VII, as well as the evolution of these means based on relative
success or failure."'170 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
the unleashing of democratic forces, a welcome renaissance has oc-
curred in the range of actions taken by the Security Council, which
will enable it to better realize its goals in maintaining international
peace and security.171
With respect to the International Thbunal's subject matter juris-
diction, the Appeals Chamber's categorization of the nature of the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia as internal or international can be
described as convoluted at best. Admittedly, the political disinte-
gration of Yugoslavia and its splintering into a handful of sovereign
nations does not lend itself to an easy application of norms and prin-
ciples that rely upon a categorical conception of conflicts as either
internal or international.' Moreover, the Security Council made
several statements prior to the establishment of the International
Tribunal that have contributed to the confusion surrounding the is-
sue. On the one hand, the Security Council condemned the pres-
ence of troops from Serbia in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a violation of their sovereignty, implying that the
strife was not merely internal in nature. 73 On the other hand, the
Security Council never explicitly stated that the conflicts in the for-
mer Yugoslavia were international.
Given this uncertainty, it is not surprising that the Appeals Cham-
ber found that the Security Council purposely refrained from classi-
fying the armed conflicts as internal or international so as not to
bind the International Tribunal in its application and interpretation
of the Statute.174 The Appeals Chamber found support for this find-
ing in the Security Council's "preoccup[ation] with bringing to jus-
Security Council, that is, the United States, Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R.,
were the same nations that established and conducted the Nuremburg and Tokyo
trials, which became a watershed in the evolution of individual criminal responsibil-
ity in international law and spawned a human rights revolution.
170. Murphy, supra note 168, at 207.
171. See id. at 286.
172. "The black letter of international humanitarian law still adheres, at least in
theory, to a categorical (though often artificial) distinction between internal and in-
ternational conflicts." Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Develop-
ment of International Law, 88 AM. J. Irrr'L L. 78, 81 (1994).
173. See S.C. Res. 752 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES752
(1992); S.C. Res. U.N. 757 SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082nd mtg., U.N. Doe. SIRESf757
(1992); S.C. Res. U.N. 779 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3118th mtg., U.N. Doe. SIRES/
779 (1992); S.C. Res. U.N. 787 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/
REsn87 (1992).
174. See Prosecutor v. Thdic, 35 LL.M. 32, 57 (1995).
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tice those responsible for... specifically condemned acts, regardless
of context,"' 7 and a statement made by the Secretary-General that,
in establishing the Tribunal, "no judgement as to the international or
internal character of the conflict was being exercised.' 17 6
Several commentators have strongly argued that the Yugoslav
conflicts should be characterized as international. 77 Their argu-
ments are not without merit; as pointed out earlier, what was once
Yugoslavia began fragmenting in early 1991 into what is now five
sovereign, internationally recognized nations.178  Throughout the
early 1990s, war between various ethnic groups raged in the territo-
ries of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, with a number of fronts
and partisan bands participating on behalf of each nation-state. 79 It
is not dispositive that some of the combatants are citizens of the
same nation-state; the conflict as a whole is clearly international.18
Even under traditional principles of international law, the "unac-
knowledged, but clear, intervention in the Bosnian conflict by [the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] on behalf of the Serbs, and against
175. Id. at 56.
176. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), 48th Sess., 1162, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General]. The Appeals
Chamber also supported this conclusion by a reductio ad absurdum argument pro-
pounded as follows: to construe the armed conflict between the Bosnian govern-
ment and the Bosnian Serbs as an international armed conflict would create the
absurd situation that crimes committed by Bosnian government forces against Bos-
nian Serb civilians would not be "grave breaches" because those civilians, as citizens
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would not be protected persons under the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, whereas crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian civilians
would be "grave breaches" because the Serbian forces would be considered agents
of another State, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). See
Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 57. The Appeals Chamber found that this would be
an absurd outcome because it would place the Bosnian Serbs at a substantial legal
disadvantage vis-A-vis the Bosnian Muslim government. Id. at 43.
One scholar has criticized this aspect of the Tadic decision, finding it to be
"scarcely convincing." See Aldrich, supra note 157, at 66. Aldrich concluded that
warfare on the scale that existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the involvement of
various states should be considered an international armed conflict, intuitively opin-
ing that "[t]he artificiality of the appeals chamber's ad absurdum argument becomes
clear when one considers that the chamber could have made the same point even
were the Bosnian Serbs-still citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina-fighting alongside di-
visions of the Belgrade army. Would anyone doubt that such a conflict was interna-
tional?" Id. at 67.
177. See Aldrich, supra note 157, at 66-67; O'Brien, supra note 43, at 647; Meron,
supra note 172, at 81 ("Because of the involvement of foreign actors, most internal
conflicts are in fact mixed internal-international conflicts.... [Hence,1 despite their
concurrent or successive character as internal, mixed or international, there are valid
reasons to consider the entire [Yugoslav] conflict as international and therefore sub-
ject to the rules on international wars.").
178. See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
179. See O'Brien, supra note 43, at 647.
180. See id. See also Aldrich, supra note 157, at 66-67.
[Vol. 49:577
LEGITIMIZING THE TRIBUNAL
the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, could transform the con-
ffict from internal to international.'' s8
The Appeals Chamber refused to categorize the Yugoslav conflict
as either wholly internal or international, concluding that both as-
pects were present and that "the Security Council intended that, to
the extent possible, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Tribunal should extend to both internal and international
armed conflicts."'" The effect of this ruling can best be illustrated
by the Appeals Chamber's subsequent rulings on the specific articles
named in Tadic's indictment.
The Appeals Chamber concluded that Article 2 of the Statute,
referring to the "grave breaches" system of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, only applied to violations committed within the context of
an international armed conflict.18 Despite indications that this rul-
ing was inconsistent with recent trends in state practice signifying a
change in international customary law, the Appeals Chamber
seemed reluctant to adopt a progressive interpretation of the "grave
breaches" system. Perhaps this reluctance stemmed from the state-
ment in the Report of the Secretary-General that "the application of
the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international
tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which
are beyond any doubt part of customary law."18 In any event, by
refusing to categorize the conflict as either internal or international,
the Appeals Chamber shifted the burden to the prosecutor to prove
that an international armed conflict existed if Tadic is to be charged
and convicted with violations of "grave breaches" under Article 2.
Having created problems for the work of the Tribunal by its deci-
sion on the characterization of the conflict and on the applicability
of Article 2,1's the Appeals Chamber "found a savior in Article 3,"
concluding that it covered all violations of international humanita-
rian law other than "grave breaches" under the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions." 6 Similarly, the Appeals Chamber upheld Article 5 as
181. Meron, supra note 172, at 81.
182. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 LL.M. 32, 58 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugo.
App. Chamber 1995).
183. See id. at 60.
184. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 176, '1 34.
185. Referring favorably to the omission of "crimes against peace" from the Stat-
ute of the International Tribunal, one commentator noted "[t]heir inclusion would
almost inevitably require the tribunal to investigate the causes of the conflict itself
(and the justifications issued by the combatants), which would involve the tribunal
squarely in the political issues surrounding the conflict." O'Brien, supra note 43, at
645.
186. Aldrich, supra note 157, at 67. Interestingly, a commentator opined in 1993
that "[t]he elastic 'but not limited to' language of Article 3 ensures that all relevant,
well-established international law falls within the tribunal's jurisdiction." O'Brien,
supra note 43, at 646. A skeptical mind wonders if this statement was a prophecy or
a catalyst for the Appeals Chamber's subsequent ruling.
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properly applying to both international and internal armed conflicts
and concluded by holding that the Tribunal had subject matter juris-
diction over the case against Tadic.'1 The import of the Appeals
Chamber's blanket holding regarding the Tribunal's subject matter
jurisdiction is unclear, since Tadic was indicted for grave breaches
under Article 2 and the Appeals Chamber opined earlier in its deci-
sion that Article 2 was only applicable to international armed con-
flicts. Was the Appeals Chamber implicitly determining that the
conflicts involved in Tadic's indictment were "international"?
The prosecution apparently concluded not, judging by its efforts
at the subsequent trial of Tadic to establish that the alleged offenses
were committed within the context of an international armed con-
flict.las Thus, the practical effect of the Tadic decision has been to
complicate the future work of the International Tribunal by requir-
ing the prosecution to research and argue the characterization of the
armed conflicts in which "grave breaches" under Article 2 are al-
leged to have occurred."8 9 Indeed, shortly after the Appeals Cham-
ber decided Tadic, one of the Tribunal's trial chambers involved in a
different case found, on the basis of expert evidence, that the con-
flict in which alleged offenses occurred was international and that
Article 2 was therefore applicable."9 In the subsequent trial of
Tadic, the prosecution attempted to duplicate this strategy, putting
military historians on the stand who testified that the war in Bosnia
was an international armed conflict. 191
In any event, the establishment of the International Tribunal
stands as an important development in the field of international hu-
manitarian law. Support for its establishment has "come from al-
most every section of the globe."'" Perhaps "[t]he next logical step
is the creation of [an international criminal] court to protect the
human rights of all the world's populations."' 93 By establishing an
187. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 58.
188. See Developments in the War Crimes Trial of Bosnian Serb Dusko Tadic
from May 7-10, 1996, supra note 9.
189. See Aldrich, supra note 157, at 68.
190. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case IT-94-2-R61 (Int'l Crim. Tib. for the Former
Yugo. Trial Chamber Oct. 20, 1995).
191. See Developments in the War Crimes Trial of Bosnian Serb Dusko Tadic
from May 7-10, 1996, supra note 9. The first such expert witness was James Gow, a
war studies professor at the University of London and a co-producer of the British
documentary "Death of Yugoslavia." See id.
192. Daniel B. Pickard, Comment, Security Council Resolution 808: A Step To-
ward a Permanent International Court for the Prosecution of International Crimes
and Human Rights Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rnv. 435, 459 (1995). See
also id. n.189 (comments of Council representatives in favor of establishing the In-
ternational Tribunal).
193. Pickard, supra note 192, at 459. Indeed, the United Nations recently estab-
lished a Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of International Criminal
Court to study the possibility of creating such an organ. See United Nations, Press
Release L12819: Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of International Crimi-
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international criminal court and relying on the rule of law rather
than the use of force, the international community would be sending
a strong signal to present and future generations that international
peace and security can be furthered and maintained while at the
same time upholding justice and preserving the dignity of the human
person.19
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic is an important
judicial affirmation of the authority of the Security Council to estab-
lish ad hoc judicial bodies in furtherance of its responsibility as the
guardian of international peace and security. By examining the va-
lidity of its own creation, the Appeals Chamber has accorded proper
respect for the rights of those accused of crimes and has furthered
the legitimacy of the International Tribunal. The Tadic decision is
also significant for its refusal to characterize the Bosnian strife as
either internal or international, and its ruling that the "grave
breaches" provisions in Article 2 are only applicable to international
armed conflicts. While the Tadic decision may be controversial and
spawn future scholarly debate, the legitimization of the Interna-
tional Tribunal undeniably stands as an important development of
international humanitarian law that hopefully signifies an evolution
from "the law of force" to "the force of law."*
Aaron K Baltes
nal Court to Meet at Headquarters, 11-21 February (visited February 16, 1997) <httpl
/vww.un.org/plweb-cgiidoc.pl?3131+. .. emational%26adj%26criminal%26adj%26
court>. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L Blakesley, The Need for an
International Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992) (arguing that an international criminal court should be
developed incrementally as an additional alternative vehicle for the prevention and
suppression of international and transnational crime).
194. See Pickard, supra note 193, at 461.
* On November 28, 1996, after 78 days in the Trial Chamber, the-trial of Dusko
Tadic ended. See Court TV Library, The Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal (visited Mar.
22, 1997) <http://www.courttv.comcasefiles/warcrimes>. On May 7, 1997, Dusko
Tadic was convicted by the Trial Chamber on eleven of the thirty-one counts of
international humanitartian law violations with which he was charged. See U.N.
Panel Convicts Bosnian Serb of War Crimes, N.Y. Tuiars, May 7, 1997, at Al. A
majority of the three-judge Trial Chamber found that the fighting in Bosnia during
the spring and summer of 1992 was not an "international conflict," see Id., and ruled
that eleven charges involving grave breaches of the Geneva Convention were not
applicable. See Court TV, The Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal (visited May 8, 1997)
<httpJ/www.courttv.comcasefileswarcrimes>. Tadic was acquitted of nine other
counts due to insufficient evidence. See id. Sentencing is scheduled for July 1, 1997.
See id. Both the prosecution and the defense intend to appeal the verdict. See U.N.
Panel Convicts Bosnian Serb of War Crimes, supra, at Al.
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